Fedaykin schrieb am 23.10.2012:Spekulation.
Nö.
Nixon stand in jener zeit der Chinalobby sehr nahe, die amjerikansiche Interventionen in Asien unterstützte. Im Fall Laos Anfang 1961 sprach er sich öffentlich für amerikanische Bombardements aus. auch bei der Niederlage der Franzosen 1954 in Bien Dien Phu befürwortete er schon eine amerikanische Intervention.
Wikipedia: Operation Vulture#Decision against the operationNixon wäre also durchaus bereit gewesen, in Laos und Vietnam 1961 zu intevenieren, mit der Option Nuklearwaffen einzusetzen.
Fedaykin schrieb am 23.10.2012:Gibt es dazu Berichte online einzusehen? Dann fülle ich diese Lücke auf
^^Die online- Artikel die ich verlinkt habe beziehen sich auf jüngste Veröffentlichungen, auch die von David Kaiser und Howard Jones. Jones´buch ist online über das Uniiversitätsbibliothekssystem verfügbar.
Fedaykin schrieb am 23.10.2012:Nein, die Kooperation im Weltall fand ja später Statt, Apollo Sosus usw. Die Auswirkungen auf die Politische Lage war da immer er gering.
Das Ereignis war auch etwas einmaliges- beim Wettrennen zum Mond hätte es jahre der Kooperation bedurft- was eher einer entspannung entsprochen hätte.
Die Kooperation, die du nennst fand über 10 Jahre später statt- da hatte sich viel verändert. Falken, die anfang der 1960er in Regierugn doer Politik waren waren 10 jahre später nciht mehr im Amt oder hatten ihre Postionen revidiert.
Fedaykin schrieb am 23.10.2012:Nixon hätte den KRieg auch eher zuende bringen können. immerhin dauerte der Vietnamkrieg deswegen so lange weil die Politik keine Strategie oder Pläne für einen Sieg hatte.
Nixon hatte auch die Friedensverhandlungen Johnsons 1968 sabotiert.
Wikipedia: Anna Chennault#Role in the Nixon campaign sabotage of Paris Peace Accordshttp://www.commondreams.org/headlines/080900-01.htm (Archiv-Version vom 04.10.2012)Fedaykin schrieb am 23.10.2012:Ein Zeichen von Schwäche sehr wohl, aber immer noch kein MOtiv ihn zu Ermorden?
wieso nicht? Falken wie general LeMay sagten ja auch, als kennedy sich wiegerte, in der Kubakrise sofort die sowjetischen raketenbasen auf der insel zu bombardieren er sei eine Gefahr für dieses land.
Im Film "seven Days in May" von 1963 wird diese mentalität sehr gut aufgezeigt- ein genral plant, den US-Präsident zu stürzen, weil dieser ein Abkommen mit den Sowjets unterzeichnen will.
Seven Days in May (1964) - John Frankenheimer
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Durch das Abspielen werden Daten an Youtube übermittelt und ggf. Cookies gesetzt.
und "Schwäche" wäre vlt. zu harmlos- bei manchen Hardlinern wäre das sogar "asuverkauf an die kommunisten" gewesen. Bis zu einer Abwahl in einem Jahr zu warten, die nicht sicher war in Augen mancher Falken gefährlich.
Fedaykin schrieb am 23.10.2012:Jedenfalls war der KK zu Kennedies Zeiten auf den Höhepunkt. Berliner Mauer, Kuba, Missle Gab, Vietnam.
DESWEGEN waren Kennedys Schritte für manche Kalten Krieger auch so gefählich.
Sonderlich schrieb am 23.10.2012:Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen dafür, das Kennedy (Süd-)Vietnam "aufgeben" wollte. Vor einem Abzug der US-"Berater" sollte der Bürgerkrieg schon noch siegreich beendet werden. JFK dachte, dass die Beseitigung von dem im Volk reichlich unbeliebtem General Diệm der FNL die Unterstützung nehmen würde, der Grund für den Bürgerkrieg also wegfallen würde - ein Trugschluss.
Alle seine Äußerungen bezüglich einer Rückkehr der US-Truppen aus Vietnam sind in diesem Kontext zu sehen.
Die Meinung, dass Vietnam eine Falle sei und die Einstellung, dass die USA sich langfristig aus Vietnam zurückzihen würden, stand schon 1962 fest. Nur das wann und wie des Rückzugs war noch unklar. Der Sturz Diems stand in keinerlei Bezug zu den langsfristigen Rückzugsplänen. Dass er nicht sofort alle truppen zurückzog hat eher mit den anstehenden Wahlen 1964 zu tun. Dass er Okt. 63 den Rückzugsbefehl aufgrund allzu optimistischer Lageberichte gab scheint wohl so nicht zu stimmen.
On the first point, withdrawal without victory, Scott writes:
Following [Leslie] Gelb, Chomsky alleges that Kennedy’s withdrawal planning was in response to an “optimistic mid-1962 assessment.” . . . But in fact the planning was first ordered by McNamara in May 1962. This was one month after ambassador Kenneth Galbraith, disenchanted after a presidentially ordered visit to Vietnam, had proposed a “political solution” based in part on a proposal to the Soviets entertaining “phased American withdrawal.”
Scott goes on to point out that it cannot be proven that Galbraith’s recommendation was responsible for McNamara’s order. But there is good reason to believe they were linked, that both reflected Kennedy’s long-term strategy on Vietnam.
The May conference thus fills in the primary record: plans were under development for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. On October 2, 1963, as we have previously seen, President Kennedy made clear his determination to implement those plans—to withdraw 1,000 troops by the end of 1963, and to get almost all the rest out by the end of 1965. There followed, on October 4, a memorandum titled “South Vietnam Actions” from General Maxwell Taylor to his fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals May, Wheeler, Shoup, and Admiral McDonald, that reads:
b. The program currently in progress to train Vietnamese forces will be reviewed and accelerated as necessary to insure that all essential functions visualized to be required for the projected operational environment, to include those now performed by U.S. military units and personnel, can be assumed properly by the Vietnamese by the end of calendar year 1965. All planning will be directed towards preparing RVN forces for the withdrawal of all U.S. special assistance units and personnel by the end of calendar year 1965. (Emphasis added.)
“All planning” is an unconditional phrase. There is no contingency here, or elsewhere in this memorandum. The next paragraph reads:
c. Execute the plan to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963 per your DTG 212201Z July, and as approved for planning by JCS DTG 062042Z September. Previous guidance on the public affairs annex is altered to the extent that the action will now be treated in low key, as the initial increment of U.S. forces whose presence is no longer required because (a) Vietnamese forces have been trained to assume the function involved; or (b) the function for which they came to Vietnam has been completed. (Emphasis added.)
This resolves the question of how the initial withdrawal was to be carried out. It was not to be a noisy or cosmetic affair, designed to please either U.S. opinion or to change policies in Saigon. It was rather to be a low-key, matter-of-fact beginning to a process that would play out over the following two years. The final paragraph of Taylor’s memorandum underlines this point by directing that “specific checkpoints will be established now against which progress can be evaluated on a quarterly basis.” There is much more in the JCS documents to show that Kennedy was well aware of the evidence that South Vietnam was, in fact, losing the war. But it hardly matters. The withdrawal decided on was unconditional, and did not depend on military progress or lack of it.
A careful review of the October 2 meeting makes clear that McNamara’s account is essentially accurate and even to some degree understated. One can hear McNamara—the voice is unmistakable—arguing for a firm timetable to withdraw all U.S. forces from Vietnam, whether the war can be won in 1964, which he doubts, or not. McNamara is emphatic: “We need a way to get out of Vietnam, and this is a way of doing it.”
http://bostonreview.net/BR28.5/galbraith.html (Archiv-Version vom 16.02.2013)Kennedy continued to resist all attempts to persuade him to send troops to Vietnam. His policy was reinforced by the Bay of Pigs operation. Kennedy told his assistant secretary of state, Roger Hilsman: “The Bay of Pigs has taught me a number of things. One is not to trust generals or the CIA, and the second is that if the American people do not want to use American troops to remove a Communist regime 90 miles away from our coast, how can I ask them to use troops to remove a Communist regime 9,000 miles away?"
In April, 1962, Kennedy told McGeorge Bundy to “seize upon any favourable moment to reduce our involvement” in Vietnam. In September, 1963, Robert Kennedy expressed similar views at a meeting of the National Security Council: “The first question was whether a Communist takeover could be successfully resisted with any government. If it could not, now was the time to get out of Vietnam entirely, rather than waiting.”
The decision by John F. Kennedy to withdraw from Vietnam was confirmed by John McCone, the director of the CIA: “When Kennedy took office you will recall that he won the election because he claimed that the Eisenhower administration had been weak on communism and weak in the treatment of Castro and so forth. So the first thing Kennedy did was to send a couple of men to Vietnam to survey the situation. They came back with the recommendation that the military assistance group be increased from 800 to 25,000. That was the start of our involvement. Kennedy, I believe, realized he'd made a mistake because 25,000 US military in a country such as South Vietnam means that the responsibility for the war flows to (the US military) and out of the hands of the South Vietnamese. So Kennedy, in the weeks prior to his death, realized that we had gone overboard and actually was in the process of withdrawing when he was killed and Johnson took over.”
Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu were murdered on 1st November, 1963. The news reached Kennedy the following day. According to David Kaiser, Kennedy “left the room in shock”. Despite this news, Kennedy made no move to change or cancel his troop reduction. As his aides, Kenneth O'Donnell and David F. Powers pointed out: “The collapse of the Diem government and the deaths of its dictatorial leaders made the President only more sceptical of our military advice from Saigon and more determined to pull out of the Vietnam War.
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKmcnarmara.htm (Archiv-Version vom 14.10.2012)
