JFK - Attentataufdeckung

Groucho schrieb: Ich glaube, eine der Kopien, bin aber nicht sicher.
Warum fragst du?

sunlay schrieb:Wie soll also dieser Schuss die Verletzungen und das zerrissene Gewebe des Kleinhirns ausgelöst haben.

sunlay schrieb:Da es aber laut des Doktors Verletzungen des Kleinhirns gegeben hat, passt das nicht zusammen.

EC145 schrieb:weil ich irgendwo gelesen habe dass die WK nur einzelne frames gehabt haben soll. und nicht mal die orginalen 26 sekunden des Z-Filmes.

sunlay schrieb:Ich habe eine Seite der Timeline im TSBD gefunden, das schöne auch noch mit Quellenhinweisen.

sunlay schrieb:Ja,

er sagt aber nun mal auch aus, dass er Kleinhirngewebe ausfindig gemacht hat, zu dem bestätigt er die Tracheotomie.

Wie kann das Kleinhirn beschädigt wurden sein, obwohl laut offizieller Theorie nur ein kleines Einschussloch hinten am Kopf von Kennedy zu beobachten war und eben nur eine große Verletzung oben rechts? Das ist dann aber nicht mit einer Teilbeschädigung des Kleinhirns (Cerebellum) in Einklang zu bringen.

EC145 schrieb:ich weiss nicht mehr welche version die WK vom Z film gehabt hat. die orginalen 26 sekunden oder eine der drei kopien?

Africanus schrieb:Schön und gut, aber wo ist nun Dein Argument?

sunlay schrieb: Er konnte nicht auf die Minute genau wissen, wann der Präsident am Fenster vorbeifährt

sunlay schrieb: Aber ich empfinde Oswalds Handlungen im TSBD als nicht passend zu einem Killer mit solch einem klaren Ziel, bei einmaliger Gelegenheit.

sunlay schrieb am 15.05.2015:Hier ziehe ich das Argument, einer abnormalen Handlungsweise heran.

sunlay schrieb am 15.05.2015:Ein Killer der vorsätzlich den Präsidenten ermorden will, verhält sich anders und hat auch keine Ambitionen zur Hellseherei, um wissen zu können, dass der Präsident erst 20 Minuten später als offiziell herausgegeben,

sunlay schrieb:Er rennt doch nicht auf Verdacht in eines der oberen Stockwerke in der Hoffnung, den Präsidenten zu erwischen. Das wäre Gestocher im Nebel und auf Zufall gestützt. Das Verhalten eines Killers ist mit so einer Vorgehensweise nicht vereinbar.

Africanus schrieb:Es nervt mich ehrlich gesagt gewaltig, dass Du hier ständig irgendwelchen Blödsinn von irgendwelchen VT-Seiten zitiertst und Dir anscheinend zu keinem Zeitpunkt irgendwelche Gedanken über das Geschriebene machst

Narrenschiffer schrieb am 24.05.2015:Die Schweinebucht-Invasion wurde letztlich zum Disaster, da die Navy eben nicht als Backup-Hilfe eingesetzt wurde.

Consequently, Kennedy and his advisers agreed to a covert operation planned and executed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan had developed during the last year of the Eisenhower administration after Cuba and the United States were ready to end all diplomatic ties. After taking office, Kennedy agreed to the plan but insisted that it mist appear to be a completely anti-Castro operation without any participation or sponsorship by the United States.

Perhaps most disturbing of all, the CIA task force in charge of the paramilitary assault did not believe it could succeed without becoming an open invasion supported by the U.S. military. The assessment was part of a brief prepared for President-elect Kennedy that he never saw. Kennedy later told one of his aides that the CIA and military did not believe he would resist their pressure to have American forces engage when the invasion was on the verge of failure.

(1) In November 1960, top aides briefed Richard Bissell, head of CIA’s covert action bureaucracy, about anti-Castro plans that had been developed that year. The session was intended to prepare Bissell for a briefing that he and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles would give President-elect Kennedy two days later in Palm Beach, Florida.
- Remarkably, Bissell’s aides told him that CIA’s plan to overthrow Castro would not work.

...But the goal of overthrowing Castro was “unachievable” under either plan, Bissell’s aides said.

There is no evidence that Bissell informed the President-elect of this judgment. Their meeting has been written about over the years by many, including Bissell in his memoirs. But nowhere in the Bay of Pigs literature or documentation have I found any indication that Bissell shared the pessimistic analysis with JFK. As Don Bohning, former reporter for the Miami Herald, has said, “Bissell seems to have had a habit of not telling people things they needed to know.”

...Notably, in looking back on the Bissell aides’ assessment and what followed in the Kennedy presidency, a perplexed Pfeiffer writes, “How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept…was ‘unachievable’…did it become ‘achievable’ in March 1961?” It is a question he cannot answer

[We] did not want to raise these issues — in an [undecipherable word] discussion — which might only harden the decision against the type of action we required. We felt that when the chips were down — when the crisis arose in reality, any action required for success would be authorized rather than permit the enterprise to fail.

The absence of any preparations for an organized uprising in Cuba, and the assurances of military support given to the rebels of the landing force, led President Kennedy to a bitter conclusion: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA must have been assuming all along that President would become so worried at the last minute about the loss of his own prestige that he would drop his restriction against the use of U.S. forces and send the Marines and the Navy jets into the action.

Narrenschiffer schrieb am 24.05.2015:Kennedy war ein Domino-Theoretiker, der aber immerhin so schlau war, dass er einen Krieg mit der Sowjetunion, der wohl nuklear ausgetragen worden wäre, für ein No-Go hielt

Those who saw the conflict more in nationalist terms at this time, thought that perhaps we could deal with Vietnam as if it were an independent Communist nation, much like Tito’s Yugoslavia. During the escalation debate in the mid 1960s, famed journalist Walter Lippmann concluded that a neutral Communist regime like Tito’s in Yugoslavia was probably the best that Washington could hope for, in regard to South Vietnam. Another news writer, David Astor, was mistakenly under the impression at that time that the U.S. government was looking at a “Titoist solution in South Vietnam.” The premise of neutralism or nonalignment in the Cold War seemed to be very much at the heart of the so-called “Gaullist” proposals coming from France since 1963. Edwin Reischauer thought that the Yugoslavia analogy could be applied to Vietnam, and a number of OSS officials who dealt with North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, felt we missed an opportunity to come to an arrangement with him in the late 1940s. Dean Acheson was aware of this argument but felt that Ho’s Stalinism was more relevant than his nationalism. In the late 1940s, this possibility was debated by government officials. A document from the Department of Defense study known as the Pentagon Papers, contained an article that asked the question, “Was Ho an Asian Tito?“ The arguments about Ho’s past affiliation and previous statements were examined along with other evidence of his possible “nationalist” Communism.

This was not enough for Acheson who had stated that we could not afford to assume that Ho was anything but a dedicated Communist, and that he was required to denounce Moscow and Peking in all ways before we would consider another possibility. The decision not to trust Ho became solid, and like other aspects of the Cold War evolved somewhat into a dogma that could not be changed. As the United States neared the point of escalation, the doubters continued to push for neutralization. Senator Mike Mansfield warned in January 1964, that we were nearing “the point of no return” in Vietnam and should seek a peaceful solution, perhaps through neutralization. Averill Harriman, Chester Bowles, John Kenneth Galbraith and Abram Chayes called for the neutralization of South Vietnam, as they pointed to the example of Laos. (Bundy to President, July 1, 1965; Bird, 272-73; Khong, 85; Pentagon Papers, Book 1, Part 1, C-1-C-5, C-29 and C-45).

A careful review of the October 2 meeting makes clear that McNamara’s account is essentially accurate and even to some degree understated. One can hear McNamara—the voice is unmistakable—arguing for a firm timetable to withdraw all U.S. forces from Vietnam, whether the war can be won in 1964, which he doubts, or not. McNamara is emphatic: “We need a way to get out of Vietnam, and this is a way of doing it.”

Since it is well known that the Pentagon did not favor withdrawal, it is fair to assume that if wiggle room existed in the President’s instructions it would surface in these documents.

Many of the new documents relate to the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference, held in Honolulu on May 6, 1963.


Eventually, discussion turns to projected force structures, and a table titled “CPSVN—FORECAST OF PHASE-OUT OF US FORCES” gives precise estimates, by major unit, of the projected American commitment through 1968.McNamara’s reaction to this timetable is recorded clearly:

In connection with this presentation, made by COMUSMACV (attached hereto), the Secretary of Defense stated that the phase-out appears too slow. He directed that training plans be developed for the GVN by CINCPAC which will permit a more rapid phase-out of U.S. forces, stating specifically that we should review our plans for pilot training with the view to accelerating it materially.

b. The program currently in progress to train Vietnamese forces will be reviewed and accelerated as necessary to insure that all essential functions visualized to be required for the projected operational environment, to include those now performed by U.S. military units and personnel, can be assumed properly by the Vietnamese by the end of calendar year 1965. All planning will be directed towards preparing RVN forces for the withdrawal of all U.S. special assistance units and personnel by the end of calendar year 1965.

http://new.bostonreview.net/BR28.5/galbraith.html (Archiv-Version vom 06.04.2015)

McNamara on Kennedy in Vietnam

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Narrenschiffer schrieb am 24.05.2015:Deine Argumente, dass Kennedy Diems Ermordung nicht beauftragte, sind überzeugend, wobei ich jedoch bei meiner Meinung bleibe, dass er ihn einkalkulierte, für möglich hielt.

Nun, alle die dabei waren, als JFK die Nachricht von der Ermordung Diems empfing, berichten, dass er sichtlich erschütttert war und "erbleichte".

DAVID KAISER Author of American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War

It is a very sad fact of modern life that journalists and popular historians have no understanding of basic rules of evidence, and do not take the trouble to find authoritative works on subjects they choose to discuss.

I exhaustively researched and reported the Kennedy Administration's role in the Diem coup in my book, American Tragedy (which is not mentioned in the Weekly Standard.) Using contemporary documentation and audio tapes, I made two things very clear.

1. On only one occasion did President Kennedy refer to Diem's possible fate in a coup. At that time--during the last week of August 1963--he definitely said that Diem should be exiled and that nothing more should happen to him.

2. The Kennedy Administration, in a last meeting on October 30--two days before the coup--simply decided that they would not stand in the way of a coup if one took place. The discussion shows considerable skepticism as to whether one was going to take place. When the execution of the coup began, Conein got about an hour's warning.

It has been well known for many, many years that Lyndon Johnson opposed the coup from the beginning, and that he (and Nixon) liked to blame the coup for the war. It should be clear to any intelligent person with any familiarity with LBJ that he was blowing off steam, not reporting verbatim conversations. He was referring to the view of Roger Hilsman and Averell Harriman (whom he fired and demoted, respectively, within months of taking office) that Diem had to be replaced.

It is sad to realize, when one has devoted years of one's life to searching out the facts of a controversial historical incident, that when it comes to controversial events, only a small minority of Americans will be interested in those facts.

http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1717#sthash.1R7HxaRb.dpuf

DAVID KAISER Author of American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War

It is a very sad fact of modern life that journalists and popular historians have no understanding of basic rules of evidence, and do not take the trouble to find authoritative works on subjects they choose to discuss.

I exhaustively researched and reported the Kennedy Administration's role in the Diem coup in my book, American Tragedy (which is not mentioned in the Weekly Standard.) Using contemporary documentation and audio tapes, I made two things very clear.

1. On only one occasion did President Kennedy refer to Diem's possible fate in a coup. At that time--during the last week of August 1963--he definitely said that Diem should be exiled and that nothing more should happen to him.

2. The Kennedy Administration, in a last meeting on October 30--two days before the coup--simply decided that they would not stand in the way of a coup if one took place. The discussion shows considerable skepticism as to whether one was going to take place. When the execution of the coup began, Conein got about an hour's warning.

sunlay schrieb:Dr. Mc Clelland und Dr.Peters bestätigen auch in diesem Video die Hinterkopfwunde.

In 1957, President Eisenhower, his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and the CIA--unbeknownst to Congress or to the American public--launched a massive covert military operation in Indonesia. Its aims were to topple or weaken Indonesia's populist President Sukarno, viewed as too friendly toward Indonesia's Communist Party, and to cripple the Indonesian army. The CIA, run by Allen Dulles, the brother of the secretary of state, funneled financial support and weapons to rebel colonels on the islands outside Java, seat of the government. In the ensuing civil war, thousands of civilians were killed; the Indonesian army put down the rebellion and crushed noncommunist political parties; Sukarno's centralized regime became more authoritarian and jettisoned parliamentary government. Historian Audrey Kahin, editor of the journal Indonesia, and Cornell professor of international studies George Kahin have written a disturbing, scholarly expose of a major covert operation that paved the way for the Indonesian army's massacre of half a million people in 1965-66 with Washington's support.

The authors maintain that Indonesia's communist party was essentially a homegrown nationalist movement and that the Eisenhower administration's fears were misguided.

In the first 20 years following the killings, thirty-nine serious estimates of the death toll were attempted.[43] Before the killings had finished, the Indonesian army estimated 78,500 had been killed,[53] while the PKI put the figure at 2 million.[43] The Indonesian army later[when?] estimated the number killed to be 1 million.[38] In 1966, Benedict Anderson had set the death toll at 200,000. By 1985 he concluded that a total of 500,000 to 1 million people had been killed.[43] Most scholars now agree that at least half a million were killed,[54] thus more than in any other event in Indonesian history.[35] An armed forces security command[which?] estimate from December 1976 put the number at between 450,000 and 500,000.[34] A 2012 documentary by Joshua Oppenheimer, The Act of Killing, places the number of deaths between 1 and 3 million people

April 25, 1961 - President John F. Kennedy before Indonesian President Sukarno's departure

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The theme of the Oliver Stone film "J.F.K." is that President John F. Kennedy planned to withdraw from Vietnam and that to prevent this, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and possibly people close to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson conspired to assassinate him. Most of this is palpable nonsense, but as Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, the officer responsible for Vietnam, I can testify that the first point is essentially true and correct.

On numerous occasions President Kennedy told me that he was determined not to let Vietnam become an American war. He agreed to have Americans serve as advisers, and he also authorized American pilots training Vietnamese to fly T-28's to do the actual flying -- covertly -- in bombing missions inside South Vietnam. But he refused every suggestion to send American combat forces.

Once, at that time, you reported in a small front-page box that some American major general was visiting Vietnam. The President called me at home and in decidedly purple language took me to task for letting an American general visit Vietnam. "Remember Laos," he said on this and other occasions; the United States, he said, must keep a low profile in Vietnam so we can negotiate its neutralization as we had in Laos.

When he paused for breath, I pointed out that I had no authority to deny a general permission to visit Vietnam -- in fact, I had not even known about the trip. "Oh," said the President and slammed down the phone without even saying goodbye. That afternoon a National Security Action Memorandum came out saying that no officer of flag or general rank could visit Vietnam without the written permission of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

When Kennedy took office, Laos was the hot spot, and the departing President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, warned Kennedy he might have to fight there. If so, Eisenhower said, he would support the decision. Over the next few weeks Kennedy made several hawkish public statements. But after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, he changed his attitude. He told several people, including Richard Nixon, that since "the American people do not want to use troops to remove a Communist regime only 90 miles away, how can I ask them to use troops to remove one 9,000 miles away?"

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy sent W. Averell Harriman to head the Geneva negotiations on Laos. Harriman was fond of saying that he got the instructions for six months of negotiations in a five-minute telephone conversation. "All these people want me to go for a military solution in Laos," Kennedy told Harriman, "but that is impossible. What I want you to do is find a political solution."

When South Vietnam asked for more aid in 1961, Kennedy sent Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and Walt W. Rostow to Vietnam to investigate. They recommended not only an increase in aid and advisers, but also 10,000 U.S. combat troops. Kennedy approved of the aid and advisers but refused to send troops. According to Roswell Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, even sending advisers was done reluctantly.

President Kennedy is sometimes quoted as citing the so-called domino theory that if South Vietnam fell, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow. But the quote is taken out of context. It was in answer to a question not about troops or fighting but about why Kennedy continued to send Vietnam economic and military aid.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in his book "Robert Kennedy and His Times," documents other episodes showing President Kennedy's determination not to let Vietnam become an American war. One was when Gen. Douglas MacArthur told him it would be foolish to fight again in Asia and that the problem should be solved at the diplomatic table. Later General Taylor said that MacArthur's views made "a hell of an impression on the President . . . so that whenever he'd get this military advice from the Joint Chiefs or from me or anyone else, he'd say, 'Well, now, you gentlemen, you go back and convince General MacArthur, then I'll be convinced.' "

Referring to the recommendation that Taylor and Rostow made to send troops, Taylor said: "The last thing he [ Kennedy ] wanted was to put in our ground forces. . . . I don't recall anyone who was strongly against [ the recommendation ] , except one man and that was the President."

In a press conference in March 1962, Kennedy said that sending combat troops would be "a basic change . . . which calls for a constitutional decision, [ and ] of course I would go to the Congress."

In July 1962 Kennedy ordered Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to start planning for the phased withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Vietnam, but it was not until May 1963 that the Pentagon produced a plan. Before his tragic death in an airplane crash, John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for international affairs, said he understood President Kennedy wanted to close out Vietnam by 1965, "whether it was in good shape or bad."

The historical record, in sum, is clear: President Kennedy was determined not to let Vietnam become an American war -- that is, he was determined not to send U.S. combat troops (as opposed to advisers) to fight in Vietnam nor to bomb North Vietnam. This does not prove he would have withdrawn completely, including the 16,500 advisers. However, the record is clear that he had laid the groundwork for doing so. Shortly before his death, he took the first step by ordering the first 1,000 advisers home. ROGER HILSMAN New York, Jan. 15, 1992

Groucho schrieb am 02.06.2015: Autopsiefotos und Zapruder Film zeigen, dass sich die beiden falsch erinnern

EC145 schrieb:ok die 26 sekunden des Zapruder filmes denk ich sind nicht Manipuliert worden.
wer aber sagt uns das die Autopsiefotos nicht doch gefälscht sind??

EC145 schrieb:ich denke man hätte eine andere leiche nehmen können und diese so präparieren können das es mit dem Zapruder film in einklang zu bringen ist. denn zeit dafür hatten die genossen aus washington ja genug.