@Solifuga Ich versuchs diesmal anders und lasse Philip Zelikow, den Vorsitzenden der 9/11-Komission höchstpersönlich zu Wort kommen. Vielleicht verstehst du es dann besser. Mehr als drei voneinander unabhängige Quellen, höchst offizielle kann ich beim besten Willen nicht mehr anbieten.
"The agencies had also developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking. As they existed on 9/11,
the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government, as I think you can see graphically depicted by that complicated chart. - FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller of the hijack via radio communication or by squawking a transponder code of "7500" -- the universal code for a hijack in progress.
- Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington.
- Headquarters then had a hijack coordinator who was the director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator to contact the
- Pentagon's National Military Command Center, NMCC, and ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.
- The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to get that assistance.
- If there was approval, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command and direct the sector to launch a fighter escort.
The protocols did not contemplate an intercept. They assumed the fighter escort would be discreet, "vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft," where it could perform its mission to monitor the flight path of the aircraft.
In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that: one, the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear; two, there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and, three, the hijacking would take the traditional form, not a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. What ensued was the hurried attempt to create an improvised defense by officials who had never encountered or trained against the situation they faced."
Quelle:
http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing12/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-06-17.htm
