Tanne schrieb:Das widerspricht sich, denn du sagst ja, die können es nicht alleine sein.
Meine Aussage war, dass weder Iran noch Nordkorea gegen China anstinken könnten. Beide Länder wären zu klein, um - ohne Mithilfe Chinas - den russischen Angriffskrieg trotz der westlichen Sanktionen zu ermöglichen. Iran kann zudem schlecht das russsische Öl ankaufen (kann es weder gebrauchen noch einfach als Teil von Lieferketten weiterverkaufen). Zumal Iran gerade selbst dringend Waffen braucht und noch kein Nachfolger für Khamenei feststeht (der Enthauptungsschlag war hier also erfolgreich, Putin ist dieser - trotz des Einsatzes von Bodentruppen - im Februar/März 2022 dagegen nicht gelungen).
Tanne schrieb:Hast du irgendwelche Beweise dafür, dass China Waffen oder Waffenteile nach Russland liefert?
Und jetzt bitte mit verifizierbarer Quelle.
Zunächst hatte ich oben bereits mehrere aktuelle Zeintungsartikel verlinkt.
Einen guten Überblick, wie China Schlupflöcher der regelbasierten Ordnung (soweit China davon überhaupt zumindest theoretisch gebunden ist) ausnutzt, um internationale Exportsanktionen zu umgehen und notwendige Teile für die russische Waffenproduktion zu liefern, habe ich hier gefunden. Die wichtigen Sätze habe ich unterstrichen, in dem Link finden sich dann weitere Fußnoten und Quellen:
Tactics for Export Control Evasion
Direct Sales: While both China and Hong Kong maintain some forms of export controls (primarily those under UN Security Council resolutions relating to non-proliferation and weapons of mass destruction)[‡‡‡] against North Korea, Iran, and Russia, China does not comply with the full scope of U.S. export controls, especially dual-use controls.[§§§] [29] Therefore, Chinese companies are shipping many otherwise export-controlled goods directly to fellow axis countries. Given the scale and capacity of China’s manufacturing sector, China’s lack of participation in export control regimes can significantly undercut them. For example, in 2024, China’s General Administration of Customs reported over $300 million in monthly exports to Russia of “high priority” dual-use items necessary for Russia’s weapons production.[30]
Transshipment through China/Hong Kong/Shell Company Buyers: Chinese and Hong Kong entities serve as vital transshipment hubs—often purporting to be final buyers of export-controlled products yet passing the controlled goods along to fellow axis countries or routing such sales through multiple third-country markets. Techniques can include changing customs product identification codes to conceal the true nature of dual-use products. Once a business hub known for adherence to international standards, Hong Kong is now a known vector of transshipment for dual-use technologies, including semiconductors, ball bearings, and machine tools.[31] Hong Kong makes it easy to hide corporate ownership and allows for the rapid creation and dissolution of companies that engage in transshipment. BIS took the novel step in June 2024 of adding entire addresses in Hong Kong to the Entity List, given a pattern of numerous shell companies engaged in transshipment registering at common Hong Kong addresses.[32]
Technology Transfer and Local Production: China has transferred technology and/or invested in local ventures for production in sanctioned countries to bypass restrictions on exports. In Iran and North Korea, for instance, Chinese joint ventures and/or technology transfers have contributed to locally produced military technology.[33] Bloomberg reported in July 2025 on a potential joint venture between Chinese drone and drone part maker Autel Robotics and sanctioned Russian drone company Aero-HIT to localize production of Autel drones in Russia.[****][34] By helping Moscow with in-country production, China minimizes risks of complications in cross-border shipping while still allowing Iran, North Korea, and Russia access to critical technologies and military products.
Quelle:
https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-facilitation-sanctions-and-export-control-evasionMan sieht also, dass China origin washing nicht nur für Produktfälschungen einsetzt, sondern auch dazu, um über Drittländer das Material für die Waffenproduktion weiter nach Russland zu liefern.
Ähnliche Zahlen finden sich hier, wo auch bestätigt wird, dass China die russische Kriegswirtschaft im Alleingang am Leben hält:
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Chinese exports to Russia have risen by more than 60 percent. Many analysts suggest that trade with China is providing nothing short of a lifeline to Russia’s economy. In the process, China has emerged as the largest supplier of not only commercial goods, but increasingly of dual-use components covered by Western export controls.
Publicly available customs data indicate that every month, China is exporting over $300 million worth of dual-use products identified by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom as “high priority” items necessary for Russia’s weapons production (Figure 1).
Quelle:
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/behind-the-scenes-chinas-increasing-role-in-russias-defense-industryEs ist auch beweisbar, dass diese Komponenten tatsächlich in Waffensystemen im Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine eingesetzt werden:
A Chinese company that owns a California electronics distributor has sent hundreds of shipments of restricted dual-use technology to Russia since the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, including to sanctioned companies with ties to the Russian military.
At least one component manufactured by the company, Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology Company Limited, was found in a Russian weapons guidance system recovered from the battlefield in Ukraine, according to a public database maintained by the Ukrainian military.
Yangjie Technology, located in the city of Yangzhou northwest of Shanghai, has sent more than 200 shipments of specific goods to Russia since the start of its full-scale invasion in February 2022, according to customs records obtained by C4ADS, a Washington-based, nonprofit data-analysis and global-research organization.
The listed contents of those shipments -- totaling at least 238 -- included electronic components categorized as "high-priority" by the United States due to their potential use in Russian weapons systems, according to the data obtained by C4ADS and shared with RFE/RL, which independently corroborated more than 150 such shipments.
Quelle:
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-china-sanctions-dual-use-yangjie-technology/33223415.htmlChina kauft solche dual use Produkte, die in Waffensystemen in Russland eingebaut werden, sogar extra aus Europa an, und verschifft sie dann weiter nach Russland:
Another indicator that a sizeable portion of China’s dual-use exports to Russia may be transhipments of European goods is the share of export volume to Russia relative to China’s imports of the same products from the EU. Where China relies extensively on EU supply for a particular product, there is a high likelihood that a significant portion of those EU-origin items is diverted from China to Russia. ...
This pattern confirms that EU-origin goods entering China can indirectly reach Russia through re-export, especially in high-dependency categories. According to a classified paper from the German Federal Foreign Office seen by German media, the EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan estimates that China (including Hong Kong) accounts for around 80% of the circumvention of EU export controls of dual-use items.
Quelle:
https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/analysis/dependence-gap-russia-china-relations#toc-dual-use-goods"dual use" bezieht sich übrigens konkret auf die Anwendbarkeit für Waffensysteme. Theoretisch könnten diese Güter auch für zivile Zwecke eingesetzt werden, aber welche sollten das in Russland sein? Diese Ambiguität dient lediglich dazu, ihren tatsächlichen Einsatz in der Rüstungsindustrie zu verschleiern.