Panaetius schrieb:Das stimmt einfach nicht.
Du bist wirklich nervig, weißt du das?
Ich habe dir das schon in etlichen Beiträgen erklärt, angefangen bereits am 26.01.
Beitrag von Zz-Jones (Seite 4.441)Natürlich stimmt es, und das weißt du genau.
Aus der der Einleitung des Updates:
This report updates and expands the data-driven work of our initial study from September 2024
Ab Seite 15 beschäftigt sich mit Studie dann mit der russischen Produktion. Dort heißt es:
2 Tracking the Russian military build-up
This chapter continues the analysis presented in September 2024 in the IfW Kiel report “Fit for war
in decades: Europe’s and Germany’s slow rearmament vis-à-vis Russia.” That report’s analysis ended
in July 2024, while this new report extends the analysis to March 2025. Although the fundamental
nature of the war as a grinding, attritional peer conflict (Vershinin: 2024) has not changed, this
eight-month period has seen noteworthy developments.
Entscheidend, deine Verständnis-Probleme betreffend, dann wohl ab Seite 16:
Methodology for estimating Russian production
This chapter’s methodology continues the approach from the September report. This is relevant
as the nature of the fighting has not fundamentally changed, including continual Russian offensive
action with tangible results. To briefly summarise, Russian units fighting in Ukraine are catalogued
to get at the Russian order of battle (ORBAT). The composition of Russian forces, from brigades
and regiments down to their constituent battalions and batteries, gives us the total number of
such standardised units in theatre. Finally, taking these units’ tables of organisation and equipment
(TOE) gives us the “paper strength” of the Russian contingent in Ukraine: the total maximum
possible number of each system in theater.
The attrition rate of Russian forces corresponds to established benchmarks for conventional
warfare. We estimate the monthly production rate needed to maintain the combat effectiveness
of the Russian contingent in theater. Additionally, we close with a brief look at exports, which
are deprioritised as compared to sustaining the troops in Ukraine and generating new forces for
confronting NATO.
Weapons systems Production has begun to plateau from Q1 2024 on. This is indicative of limits on maximum Russian force generation. Furthermore, depending on the weapons system category, production relies to a
variable degree on retrofitting rather than entirely new systems. This is most pronounced for tanks,
tracked artillery, and certain IFVs, and less so for other systems.
Approximately 75% of Russian land power is currently deployed to Ukraine, and sustaining this
force is the ceiling on Russian production for the time being. Of note is the apparent decrease in
Lancet production. This is likely a function of how we measure Lancet production, which is by
counting confirmed Lancet strikes from video footage. The limitation of this approach is that it
cannot directly account for potential stockpiling.
Monthly production rates fluctuate significantly, increasing rapidly before eventually plateauing
as Russian force generation slows. Each following graph shows three different lines summarising production. Sustainment shows what is needed for the forces currently fighting in Ukraine. Generation
summarises the new materiel needed for the 25th Combined Arms Army and the 40th and 44th Army
Corps, new formations intended to bulk up Russian mass and likely combat capable by October 2024.
Finally, production ceiling shows the maximum possible production if Russia chooses to produce at
the intensity needed to generate new units as well as sustain troops already in Ukraine.
Quelle:
https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/e880656a-f9f2-47d4-845c-136cea3e4b11-Kiel_Report_no3.pdfVollkommen gleiche Methodik, was ja auch einleuchtet, wenn man von einem "Update" spricht.
Was bitte ist daran unverständlich?
