Die Tatsache, dass im Cockpitbereich nur im Körper des 1.Offiziers und im Körper des Pursers jeweils ein (1!)untergewichtiger Kubus und ein (1!) ebenso untergewichtiger bow-tie (also fliegen- bzw. schmetterlingsförmiger) Schrapnell gefunden wurde.
Das ist, angesichts der Schrapnelldichte eines BUK-SK der in unmittelbarer Cockpitnähe gezündet haben soll, eindeutig zu wenig!
Details und Nachweis hier: https://www.allmystery.de/themen/gw1...249#id15016968
Der russischen Föderation ist das ebenfalls aufgestossen:
The Russian Federation provided three different argumentations to reason that the analysis of the damage pattern and the location of detonation based thereon were incorrect.Antwort DSB
The Russian Federation established a detonation location for the warhead on the basis of its own observations and assessments of the damage pattern, using the so-called stringing method. This point was closer to the aeroplane and outside the volume of space in which the warhead must have detonated as established by the Dutch Safety Board. Because the detonation point established by the Russian Federation is closer to the aeroplane, the Russian Federation arrived at a different conclusion about the type of warhead.
The Russian Federation stated that if a 9N314M warhead detonated at the point that it determined, the damage to the aeroplane - in particular the cockpit - would have been considerably more extensive. For this reason, the Russian Federation posited that a smaller warhead must have caused the damage pattern observed.
The method used by the Russian Federation cannot be used to determine the exact detonation location of a warhead on the basis of the impact damage caused by fragments, as the trajectory described by such fragments before and after impact is not linear. The stringing method that was used only yields a general indication of the direction from which fragments approached the aeroplane. In addition, the Dutch Safety Board investigated whether the detonation of a smaller warhead could have caused the damage found. TNO simulations, however, proved that the effects of the detonation of a smaller warhead at the detonation point established by the Russian Federation are not consistent with the damage pattern observed, in particular with regard to the boundaries of the impact pattern.Anmerkung: ob nun die Simulationen der TNO Holländer tatsächlich genauer sind, als die Faden (also mit Geraden arbeitenden) Methode von AA ist die Frage. Kommt mir ein wenig wie das NIST Computermodell zu WTC 7 vor , das geheim gehalten wird und geglaubt werden muss.
2.Anmerkung: klarer Widerspruch also
The Russian Federation also applied the stringing method to establish a detonation location in an other way. In this, the Russian Federation also took into account the impact damage on the inside of the fuselage. For this purpose, use was made of photographs showing holes in various frames and stringers (the inside of the fuselage). Strings were run from the holes in the frames and stringers through the holes in the fuselage in order to arrive at a detonation location. The detonation location established in this manner lies outside the volume of space in which the detonation must have taken place as established by the Dutch Safety Board. Besides that, the location deviates from the detonation location established by the Russian Federation mentioned under point 1.
As indicated above, the stringing method that was used is not a sound method for determining an exact detonation point on the basis of impact damage. Moreover, the damage on the inside of the fuselage cannot be included in such an analysis, as the
fragments of a warhead that penetrate an object do not continue in the same
direction; instead, they deviate from their course and ricochet. Therefore,
the trajectory that would be described by a warhead fragment inside an aeroplane’s fuselage cannot be deduced and cannot be used to determine a warheads detonation location. Only the impact pattern caused by penetrations, perforations and ricochets visible on the outside can be used to determine the general origin of the fragments.
3.The Russian Federation stated that the operation of the so-called ‘proximity fuse’ - a sensor inside the missile - is of such a nature that a 9N314M warhead carried by a 9M38- series missile would not have detonated in the volume indicated by the Dutch Safety Board. According to the Russian Federation, the detonation location for the combination of the type of missile and warhead concerned would be about 3 to 5 metres further to the rearAnmerkung: das ist erheblich und ändert viel (vgl. tarens Erkenntnisse)
The data pertaining to the sensor involved were received - through the Russian Federation - from the manufacturer of this type of missile. The data was used in new calculations and on the basis of these calculations, the Dutch Safety Board concluded that it was technically possible that a 9N314M warhead carried by a 9M38 series missile detonated in the volume of space as indicated by the Dutch Safety Board.Anmerkung: und genau hier zeigt sich, dass das DSB sich die Fakten zurecht rückt, auf Biegen und Brechen!
user aquadraht hat dies in einem Kommentar hier sehr gut ausgeführt:
https://www.freitag.de/autoren/gunna...?komplett=true vgl. Kommentare
the bow-tie shaped fragmentsAnmerkung: und exakt das stimmt, vgl. oben mit dem Nachweis von jeweils nur einen (!) Kubus und einem (!) bow-type Schrapnell in 1.Offizier und Purser.
The Russian Federation provides three general reasons why the discovery of the
pre-formed (cubic and bow-tie shaped) fragments would be insufficient evidence
to demonstrate that the aeroplane was hit by a 9N314M warhead that detonated
to the upper left-hand side of the cockpit, in close proximity to it
The Russian Federation stated that, assuming that a 9N314M warhead detonated close to the aeroplane, the number of bow-tie shaped and cubic fragments found is too small.
In addition, the Russian Federation stated that the ratio of the different shapes of the particles found is not commensurate with the ratio between these shapes in a 9N314M warhead.
Antwort DSB :
.....Two bow-tie shaped and two cubic fragments were recovered from the bodies of crew members and from the wreckage...Anmerkung: die geben das auch noch zu, wobei exakt ein Kubus und ein bow-tie die ganze BUK Geschichte dieses abschliessenden DSB Berichts stützen. Die anderen Schrapnelle stammen ja aus dem Wrack, was erst ab Nov.2014 nach Holland gebracht wurde, was somit Veränderungen unterworfen sein konnte.
Allein von daher muss man diesen Bericht sehr,sehr kritisch sehen!
Der Erklärung des DSB dass die Schrapnelle im Wrack verloren gehen konnten ist zu folgen, nicht aber dass der DSB Bericht letzlich auf ein (einziges!!) bow tie shaped Schrapnell im Purser und einem Kubus im 1.Offizier reduziert werden kann, was vgl. russ.Pkt. 1. von Russland mit Recht kritisiert wurde.
..the damage to the aeroplane - in particular the cockpit - would have been considerably more extensive. For this reason, the Russian Federation posited that a smaller warhead must have caused the damage pattern observed.
2.2.Anmerkung: um die 25 % zu leicht, richtig.
The Russian Federation stated that, based on a test performed by Almaz-
Antey, the weight of the pre-formed fragments found does not match with
the fragments originating from a 9N314M warhead. The fragments are
supposedly too light.
3.Anmerkung: auch das stimmt
The Russian Federation stated that the discovery of such pre-formed fragments is insufficient evidence for concluding that these originated from a specific type of surface-to-air missile. According to the Russian Federation, such pre-formed fragments are present in other weapon systems as well, including air-to-air missiles.
Und dann noch S.98 :
The Russian Federation stated that the possible trajectories that the missile could have followed to the detonation location volume were calculated incorrectly. It was alleged that the calculations had been based on faulty conditions. The Russian Federation especially stated that the detonation location was calculated incorrectly. On the basis of its own calculations, the Russian Federation stated that the missile trajectory would have originated from a limited area to the south of the village of Zaroshchenskoye.DSB Antwort:
The Russian Federation based its calculations on an incorrect detonation point and rientation of the weapon, resulting in an incorrect missile trajectory.Nun, das ist die, so wie das DSB das glaubt (!) nicht einfach zu beantwortende S t r e i t frage.